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ABSTRACT 
The reliability of the earnings forecasts has been a topic of criticism recently 
since some of the listed companies are found to have documented a large 
discretipency between the actual and forecast profits. This study intend to 
substantiate the previously documented evidence on the Initial Public Offerings 
forecast errors of the Main Board. The IPO for firms listed on the Second Board for 
the period 1989 to 1994. The companies under study covered a wide range of sectors 
such as Industrial, Consumer, Construction, Trading/Service and Finance. 
The forecast accuracy is measured by forecast errors, absolute forecast errors 
and squared forecast error. The level of forecast accuracy appears to be better for the 
Second Board listed companies compared to that of Main Board IPOs. The accuracy 
levels are closed to the developed markets such as United Kingdom, United States and 
Australia. 
A multiple regression model was needed to explain the variation in the 
absolute forecast errors (the dependent variable) with firms characteristics as 
independent variables. The only variable that showed significant relationship with 
absolute forecast errors was forecast interval that is the time between the prospectus 
issued date and the year end of the forecast pertain. Other variables, such as Auditor 
Choice, Age Size Financial Leverage, Industry sectors were not significant. In 
general, the findings are consistent with that reported for the Main Board !POs 
(Shamser et. AI. 1 994) and inconsistent with those reported in developed markets. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The KLSE put up a remarkable performance in 1996 placing itself among the 
region's best performers with 24 percent annual gain. The market's barometer, the 
KLSE Composite Index (KLCI) put up a reasonably good performance in 1996, 
improved by over 20 percent, exceeding the average annual increase of 15 percent 
from 1990 onwards. The KLSE saw a record with 92 new listing in 1996, with 40 
listed on the main board and 52 on the second board. 
In the blooming financial market, many companies went for public listing on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange to obtain funds for future expansion, modernisation 
and future growth. To be listed on the KLSE, the companies had to comply with the 
listing requirement of KLSE and the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 . Other 
than that, the company should have a good track record and should have made 
reasonable profits with prospects of continued earnings. 
The company need to understand and consider certain issues prior to float and 
listing of a company shares. The assessment on the company strength in relation to 
the listing potential such as shareholding and financial structures, track record, etc. 
The next section discusses the listing criteria on KLSE. 
1.2 LISTING PROCEDURE 
A) PRE-LISTING 
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The company should consider the following criteria before the flotation and listing 
of a company's share. 
• Timing 
One prerequisite for a public listing is that a company should have a good track 
record of reasonable profits with prospects of continued good earnings. The earnings 
must be sufficient to justify a price earnings (PIE) multiple within the limits set by the 
Security Commission (SC) and a share offer price that is attractive enough to the 
offerors of the shares since some listing of companies are by way of an offer for sale 
method. 
• Capitalisation 
The price of the shares, the PIE multiple, and the earnings per share (EPS) are 
determined not only by a company's pre-tax profits but also by the size of it's issued 
capital. The more the shares are issued, the higher will be the PIE multiple and lower 
the EPS, and vice versa. A valuation of a company's properties may show a surplus 
over the balance sheet value. Moreover, to make the company's share more 
marketable at the offer price a further right issues to the existing shareholders before 
the flotation will be necessary, which will lower the offer price per share. 
• The proportion of shares to be sold 
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For a Second Board Listing, the minimum proportion of a company's share that 
has to be offered for sale to the public is 25%. In addition, 30% of the equity has to b.e 
offered to Bumiputera investors or approved Bumiputera institutions (by MITI). The 
Bumiputera shareholdings can either be restructured at the point of making offer for 
sale to the public, or prior to the offer. 
• Restructuring 
In order not to burden the public with additional risk in investing in the company, 
a certain potentially profitable subsidiary which is still in the start up situation may 
need to restructured and stay out of the company to be listed. 
• Denomination Of Shares 
As RMI shares are considered to be norm on Malaysia, it was necessary to change 
the nominal value of companies shares by way of a share split before the flotation 
exercise if the nominal value of the company's share is more than RMI. 
B) LISTING PROCESS 
There are three modes of issue of shares to the public i.e. prospectus issue to the 
public, offer for sale and tender issue. A flotation exercise is a complex task which 
simultaneously involves the management, directors and existing shareholders; the 
merchant bankers, lawyers, issuing house, valuers, and auditors; and the relevant 
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authorities -FIC,SC, ROC, MITI, and the KLSE. Each will play a part in their 
respective approval . 
Under section 6, Security Industry Act 1 983, the company must submit its 
application to the CIe. The company also need to submits its Memorandum and 
Articles of Association for KLSE's approval and files initial listing application and 
supporting papers with KLSE. The average time for approval is estimated to be 1 6-24 
weeks. Upon approval from CIC and KLSE, the company registers its prospectus with 
the Registrar of Companies (ROC). Then the company will advertise and issue the 
prospectus to the public within the offer periods. If the shares are over subscribed by 
the public, balloting should provide for as wide a spread of shareholders as possible. 
The company then announces basis for allotment and issues shares pursuant to the 
allotment. 
The role of professional advisers involved in the first listing: 
1 .  Management Consultant 
• To recommend and map out the listing strategies for the company. 
• Advising on the management structure 
• Coordinating and liaising with various professional advisers on listing 
• Assisting clients in collating all information required for submission to the 
relevant authorities. 
2. Merchant Bankers 
• Underwriting of shares 
• Dealing with the KLSE, SC and other relevant authorities 
• Submission to Security Commission (SC) 
3. Accountants and Auditors 
• Preparing Accountants' Report for inclusion in the prospectus 
• Auditor's letter on the profit forecast of the company 
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• Long form Accountants' Report for inclusion in the submission document 
4. Tax Advisers 
• Tax planning with the objective of reducing tax bills 
• Advising client on tax implication on the followings issues : 
i) Dividends 
ii) Profit & Loss from sale of securities 
iii) Corporate reconstruction 
5. Legal Advisers 
• To ensure necessary documentation and legal agreements are in order 
• Review the prospectus to confirm that the contents of the prospectus are 
factually correct 
6. Other Advisers 
• Valuers 
• Public relation 
The regulatory authorities in the approval of the public listing are: 
1. FIC (Foreign Investment Committee) 
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• Look into the compliance of the equity structure of a public listing company 
i.e. minimum 30% for Bumiputera and 25% public. 
2. MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) 
• Approval concerned with the allocation of shares to employees under the pink 
form. 
3. ROC (Registrar of Companies) 
• The company seeking public listed in KLSE must registered with the ROC. 
• The prospectus issues to the public must registered with ROC 
4. SC (Security Commission) 
The SC was established on 1 March 1993 under Securities Commission Act, 
1993. Its establishment marked a significant milestone in the development of 
Malaysia's securities industry. The SC was formed to removed the problems of 
fragmented regulation of the capital market resulted by the rapid development of 
the capital market. The application of public listing will be prepared and 
submitted to the SC by the merchant bank based on the information provided by 
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the issuer. The policies and guidelines for admission of securi ties to lis ting 
admission is issued and reviewed by the SC . The main thrus t of the main set of 
guidelines and po licies in relation to the public offer are the requirement for the 
issuer of the securi ties to determine the share price. 
5 .  KLSE (Kuala Lumpur S tock Exchange) 
The KLSE was set up as an exchange of i ts own in July 1973  following the spli t 
of the S tock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore into two exchang es namely the 
KLSE and the S tock Exchange of Singapore (SES ).  Before a company is lis ted on the 
KLSE, i t  mus t submit i ts app lication to Capi tal Issues Committee. Then, the company 
must submi t M emorandum and Articles of Association of company to the KLSE for 
approval. The company also need to files ini tial lis ting appl ication and supporting 
paper wi th KLSE. 
(C ) LISTING CRITER IA 
The fo llowing are the admission cri teria to listed in KLSE: 
1. Main Board 
a) Minimum issued and paid up capi tal of RM40 mil lion, wi th no maximum 
specified. 
b)  A track record of 5 years excep t  for privatised or Government-owned enti ti es 
where a short track record could be  considered by the S ecuri ty Commission 
(SC) .  
Page 8 
c)  Should have achieved a minimum after- tax profit of not less than RM5 mill ion 
per annum. 
d) Should have achieved a minimum after tax profit of RM2 mill ion per annum 
for the past 5 years. 
e) Forecast before tax profit should be at least RM5 mill ion. 
f) At least 25 % of the issued and paid up capital in the hands of publ ic, provided 
that at least a minimum percentage or a minimum amount (whichever is the 
greater) of the issued and paid-up capital is held by not less than 500 
shareholders holding not less than 500 shares each. 
g)  To advertise and issued a prospectus comply with the requirements of the 
Company Act 1965 . 
2. Second Board 
a) Minimum Issued and paid-up capital of RMIO million and maximum of 
RM40 mill ion. 
b)  Should have a track record of 3 years. 
c )  Should have achieved an average profit after tax ofRM2 mill ion per annum. 
d )  Should have achieved a minimum profit after tax ofRMI mill ion per annum. 
e)  Forecast year's profit after tax ofRM2.5 mill ion. 
f) At least 25 % but not more than 50% of the issued and paid-up cap ital must be 
in the hands of the p Ubl ic. Regardless of the s ize of paid-up cap ital, at least 
1 5 %  of the issued and paid-up capital must be in the hands of 500 
shareholders holding 500 to 10,000 shares each. 
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g)  No requirement to advertise the full prospec tus. Only summary of the relevant 
details is re quired to be advertised. 
1.3 INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERS 
Based on the requirement of Part 7 ,  the Company Act 1965, the company seek for 
lis ted on the Kuala Lumpur S tock Exchange is required to issue a prospec tus to the 
publ ic. Under this method, new shares are being issued to the public at the offer price 
(IPO) ,  wi th the full sum of the offer price going into the company's account. The 
prospectus mus t contained all the information required by the S tock Exchange so that 
the investing public can make an informed decis ion when subscrib ing for the 
company's share. Inves tors subscrib ing to the new issues should unders tand the 
content of the prospec tus. 
There are two types ofIPOs. Firs t, the sales of new shares to the publ ic by the issuer 
for the raising new funds. Second, the offer for sales , where a sale of previously 
issued shares by their owners , rather than issuers. The funds were received by the 
original investors. Private placements of shares are permi tted in limited cases , and 
account for about 5-10 percent of the funds raised in the stock exchange.  
The underwriters bel ieve that inves tors will be more incl ined to have a s tronger 
confidence in an issuer if there is a profit forecas ts available. Analysis can be done 
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to determine the potent ial profitab il ity of the ent ity. Hence it is the fundamental for 
the evaluat ion process of the Init ial Public Offer (IPOs ) by the investors. 
1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Earnings forecasts of the issuing companies have become a top ic of cr iticism 
recently s ince some of the l isted companies are found to have a wide gap between 
their actual earnings and what have been forecasted in their respect ive prospectus. 
The regulatory authorities approve new issue with care, and it takes about 4-6 months 
for the approval process. The potent ial for the h igher risk of price changes relat ive to 
the offer pr ices makes it interest ing to study IPOs in develop ing markets. 
When a company's management decides to raise external cap ital to finance an 
investment project, they have the access to the information as to the project 's future 
re turns than other potent ial investors. Without the transfer of the information to the 
investors, the market mechanism will fail and the investors will discount the potent ial 
profitability of the inves tment project. 
This study intend to substantiate the previously documented findings on the IPO 
forecast error. (Dr Shamser Mohamad (UP M), Dr Annuar Md Nass ir (UPM), Mr Tan 
Kung Kuing (MASB) and Dr Mohamed Ariff (NUS ), 1994) 
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The objectives of the studies are: 
1 .  Investigates the predictive accuracy of profit forecasts made by Malaysian 
IPOs (listed on the KLSE in the period 1 989 - 1 994 for Second Board) in their 
prospectuses. 
2 .  To investigates the forecast errors based on different industrial categories. 
3. Assesses the degree of professionalism of accounting firms responsible for 
certifying such forecasts. 
4. To determine the possible factors that influences the accuracy of the forecast 
profit. 
CHAPTER TWO 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The reliability of the Initial Public offer forecast error has been an area of fre quent 
research. The investors are unable to observe a consensus market price if the forecast is 
not reliable. When the management decides to raise external capital to finance an 
investment project, they are more likely to have monopolistic access to information as to 
project 's future returns and other potential investors. Information asymmetry exis ts 
between the sellers and the buyers will lead to failure in the market mechanism. 
The investors rely on the accounting figures to evaluate the subscription price 
asked by the issuer is warranted. Therefore, the forecast accuracy is important concern 
for the investors . In United States and United Kingdom, the usefulness of the pro fit 
forecasts provide by the management in the prospectuses is a regulatory concern. 
Most of the studies have shown the reliability achieved was not encouraging . In 
UK, Devv & Webb (1972 ) have found that the forecast errors is ranging from negative 
50% to positive 100%. Meanwhile, Firth & Smith (1 992 ) has studied on the New Zealand 
new issues and the errors ranges from negative 500 % to above positive 500%.  
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Jaggi and Sannella (1 996) examines whether there is association between 
discretionary accounting changes and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. 
The findings suggests that the managers will release a forecast on a voluntary basis only 
they are able and willing to "control" reported earnings through discretionary accounting 
changes. These result thus support Brown's (1 988) argument that the release of a 
management forecast reflects the self-selection bias of the forecaster, and that the 
forecaster has the ability to control events that impact reported earnings and affect the 
magnitude of the forecast error. 
Ferris (1 976) undertaken an investigation to generate empirical evidence on the 
apparent effects on managerial behavior in the forecast-disclosing firms. The results 
showed that the managers act as if they under-estimate the published prospectus forecast. 
24.7% of the companies reported results within a zone of acceptable values around the 
forecast and only 7 companies reported results within the zone because they had 
apparently utilised accounting adjustments for that purpose. Therefore, the managerial 
behavior that can be deduced from the findings are the management may utilise internal 
discretionary actions to ensure achievement, but they do not accounting adjustments. 
Richard (1976) carry out study on the accuracy of the analysts' forecast and to 
identify differences in forecasting ability among analysts. Five analysts were identified 
who made forecasts for a common sample of 93 firms. The forecasts of 1972 earnings 
were made during the period from December 1971  through February 1 972 in New York. 
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The various tests has carried out, however, do suggest that differences among the 
forecasts of various analysts are not significant. The ANOV A showed that the accuracy 
of the forecasts studied was a function of industry and firm but that the analyst making 
the forecast made no significant difference. 
The recent study by Vivek Mande ( 1 996), compared the US and Japanese 
Analysts' forecast earnings and sales. This study finds that Japanese analysts provide 
superior forecasts of sales when compared to their US counterparts. Their relative 
superiority could not be attributed to any timing advantage with regard to forecasting. 
Instead, the results suggest that Japanese analysts have an informational advantage over 
their US counterparts. Selected proxies for the information environment were used to 
explain the Japanese analysts forecasts superiority over hislher US counterpart. 
Specifically, they showed that as the number of lines of business and domestic affiliates 
(firm size) increased, the relative sales forecast accuracy of the Japanese analysts also 
increased. The percentage of foreign ownership was strongly related only to relative 
earnings forecasts accuracy; as the outside ownership increased, the relative advantage of 
the Japanese analyst decreased. The results also suggested that investors interested in 
foreign stocks may be informationally disadvantage if they do not familiarise themselves 
with capital market norms and culture of the foreign country. Related research by Brown, 
Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski (1 987) suggests that superior forecasts result from a 
timing advantage (i.e. analysts with recent forecasts are likely to forecasts more 
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accurately) and an infonnational advantage (i.e. analysts with access to superior 
infonnation sets are likely to forecast more accurately) with regard to forecasting. 
Imhoff & Pare (1 982) extends previous emperical work on the comparative 
accuracy of all three forecasting sources i.e. security analysts, corporate management, 
and naIve forecast models by using a single sample of finns. All of the forecast agents are 
evaluated using both previously applied error metrics, and alternative error metrics which 
seem superior relative to those used in prior studies. The results using the relative error 
metrics confinn that no significant differences between forecasts agents. If the 
infonnation is symmetrical and is acquired and process efficiently, then no differences 
between the non-detenninistic forecast sources would be expected and no meaningful 
differences between their infonnation sets would be observed. 
Harford ( 1 969) comment that the profit forecast would appear to be important in 
fixing the issue price. It is assumed that the IPO is correctly priced, with the given 
forecast profit, then the initial listing price would be expected to be close to the issue 
price. Unfortunately, the IPO underpricing in the short run is nonnally observed. In 
Malaysia, extensive research has been carried out on the underpricing of the IPO. 
Shamsher, Annuar & Ariff (1994) documented that new issues in United Kingdom, 
Australia, United States and other developed markets, Malaysia and Singapore and others 
developing markets are substantially underpriced because offer prices appear to be a deep 
discount of the initial listing day market prices. The short run underpricing of 1 35 percent 
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in Malaysia is 7.5 times the nonnal secondary market return of 1 8  percent (Ratio for 
Singapore = 2.6). Ariff and Chung ( 1993) work out an average ratio of 1 .6 for the 
developed markets. 
Beatty (1 989) relates the initial public offering pricing with the auditor reputation. 
He hypothesised that an inverse relation exists between the reputation of the auditor of an 
initial public offering and the initial return earned by an investor. Specifically, clients that 
hire more reputable CPA finns should exhibit lower initial returns than clients that 
choose to hire CPA finns with less reputation capital at stake. Two proxies for auditor 
reputation are used to test this hypothesis. The first reputation proxy uses indicator 
variables for auditor size. Results indicate that widely used Big-Eightlnon-Big Eight 
classification may measure CPA finn reputation capital with error particularly for the 
smaller Big Eight and larger non-Big Eight finns. A second reputation proxy is 
developed by regression compensation paid to the auditing finns on measures of 
marginal cost of perfonning the audit. Results indicate that clients that pay a premium for 
their registration audit exhibit lower initial returns for their investors. Thus, the results of 
both tests provide support for the hypothesised inverse relation between reputation and 
initial public offering initial return. 
Collins & Hopwood (1 980) study the extents past research by providing a 
comparison of the relative accuracy of annual earnings forecasts generated from the 
quarterly forecasts of financial analysts and the four univariate time-series models 
